FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 4 | Issue 2

Article 3

3-1-2006

Neuroscience and the In Corpore-ted First
Amendment
Rodney J.S. Deaton

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Rodney J. Deaton, Neuroscience and the In Corpore-ted First Amendment, 4 First Amend. L. Rev. 181 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol4/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NEUROSCIENCE AND THE
IN CORPORE-TED FIRST AMENDMENT

RODNEY J.S. DEATON

INTRODUCTION

Late in the October 2002 term, the Justices of the Supreme
Court decided the case Sell v. United States in which a criminal
defendant pleaded to the Court to forbid his treating psychiatrists
from forcing the administration of antipsychotic medication that
would render him competent to stand trial.1 Sell raised questions
about a criminal defendant's "right to refuse treatment" - an issue
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Harvard Law School (J.D., 1990). The author wishes to thank Professor
Richard Fallon for his kind assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). "Psychotic" is a general
term used to describe psychological states which may arise out of a variety of
medical/psychiatric conditions. In psychosis, persons lose touch with reality as
it is commonly understood, causing them to experience symptoms of
hallucinations (false perceptions) and delusions (fixed, false beliefs not shared
by members of a distinct subculture).
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
DISORDERS, TEXT REVISION 821-27

See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC

STATISTICAL

MANUAL

OF

MENTAL

(4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
"Psychotropic medication" refers to the classes of medications used to treat
psychiatric disorders. "Antipsychotic medication" refers to the class of
psychotropic medications used to treat the severe symptoms of psychosis.
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that courts
and commentators have debated quite loudly for many
2
years.
Yet Sell, written by Justice Breyer, is itself a relatively quiet
opinion, at least as far as Supreme Court opinions often go - short
in length and calm in rhetoric.3 Sell is a straightforward extension
of the Court's previous cases on forced antipsychotic medication.
2. In this article, I will limit discussion of the "right to refuse treatment"
to the right to refuse treatment with psychotropic medications. The term has
also been applied generally to the right to refuse medical care such as, for
example, at the time of death. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 819-21 (2d ed. 2002).

In terms of the right to refuse psychotropic medications, judicial and
academic commentators have consistently divided between those who have
tended to favor an approach with more judicial oversight of the treatment
refusal process, see, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337
(N.Y. 1986); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL 125-56 (2000); Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic

Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461
(1977); and those who have tended to favor an approach more deferential to
medical decision making. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc); ROBERT I. SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
95-120 (2d ed. 1991); Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, "Rotting With
Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal
by PsychiatricPatients,7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979).
3. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented on
procedural rather than on substantive grounds. Sell, 539 U.S. at 186-87
(Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the demarcation between procedure and
substance in this case was not at all clear. See The Supreme Court, 2002
Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 307 (2003) [hereinafter
Leading Cases]. Justice Scalia took issue with the court invoking an exception
to the final judgment rule to consider Sell, 539 U.S. at 188-90, 193, but Justice
Breyer justified the action by writing that "involuntary medical treatment
raises questions of clear constitutional importance," Id. at 176, thereby linking
the procedural posture of the case to the substantive issue to be decided. See
Leading Cases at 313-15.
4. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1992) (holding that the
State failed to show that the antipsychotic drug treatment was medically
appropriate or essential, thereby violating prisoner's due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990)
(denying a prisoner's due process claim and upholding the State's interest in
forced treatment of antipsychotic drugs).
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In this case, as in those earlier cases, the Court carefully delineated
the right of defendants to refuse treatment as one protected under
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.5 This quiet opinion is
especially interesting, though, for what it did not address and what
may be unavoidable in the near future. Justice Breyer never
mentioned the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause as a
constitutional basis for the right-to-refuse-treatment doctrine.6 Yet,
for more than twenty years, judicial opinion 7 and academic
commentary8 have articulated that this right should be based on
5. The Fifth Amendment states in part "No person shall be ... deprived
U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
6. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 953 (6th Cir. 1998);
Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Santonio, No. 2:00-CR-90C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5892, at *3-*4 (D. Utah
May 4, 2001); Rogers, 478 F.Supp. at 1366-67. In Harper, the defendant raised
a First Amendment claim in a lower state court, but the Washington Supreme
Court did not rule on the claim. Washington v. Harper, 759 P. 2d 358, 361 n.2
(Wash. 1988). Therefore, the United States Supreme Court did not consider
the claim for procedural reasons. Harper,494 U.S. at 258 n.32 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see infra note 51 (discussing
Justice Stevens' reference in his dissent to First Amendment themes).
At the time of Sell, the Court had before it on a petition of certiorari
another case in which the appellate court had considered First Amendment
arguments when it found for a heightened scrutiny review in the case. United
States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2002). After Sell was decided, the
Court accepted the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to
the lower courts for re-decision in light of Sell. United States v. Gomes, 539
U.S. 939, 939 (2003). Eventually the district court, applying the Sell standard
(with no First Amendment references) ordered the defendant to take
antipsychotic medication to make him competent to stand trial. United States
v. Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158, 169 (D. Conn. 2004).
8. Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis
of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs,53 LA. L. REV. 283, 319-26 (1992)
(concluding that involuntarily hospitalized persons should be afforded full
self-determination and bodily integrity rights); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to
Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U.
MIAMI
L. REV. 1 (1989) (arguing that, in most situations, the First
Amendment should be the standard under which involuntary administration
of psychotropic drugs is analyzed); Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
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First Amendment grounds. Furthermore, the briefs filed in Sell
were anything but silent on this issue, whether arguing for 9 or
against '° the expansion of the right to refuse medication to
incorporate the First Amendment. Sell, however, was decided only
on Due Process grounds."
In psychiatry, one must be careful about over-interpreting
the silence of patients. In law, one must be similarly careful about
the silence of a Supreme Court opinion. Often the only fruitful
thing to do with silence is to see what ideas may arise out of it. The
Justices' silence in Sell may, for example, reflect a lack of interest or
a disbelief in the merit of arguments for the right to refuse
treatment based on a traditional First Amendment theory of
"freedom of thought."1 2 Some very provocative ideas may arise
from this silence of Sell, though, that are not only about an
important doctrine in law and psychiatry. Within this silence, one
may end up considering ideas that could prompt the Court to reexamine how one should talk not only about "freedom of thought,"
but also free speech jurisprudence as a whole.
Such a reon Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to Kendra's Law, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2401, 2416-18 (2000) (contending that a New York law for involuntary
medication in the absence of an emergency or an incompetence declaration is
unconstitutionally vague and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments);
cf. Kris W. Druhm, Comment, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California
Penal Law 645, the Castrationof Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 285, 332-36 (1997) (analyzing First Amendment implications of
forcing sex offenders to take the potentially feminizing medication DepoProvera).
9. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 2-6, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003) (No. 02-5664); Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)
(No. 02-5664); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text.
10. Brief for the United States at 36-38, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166 (2003) (No. 02-5664); Brief for American Psychiatric Association and
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 9, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664)
[hereinafter APA/AAPL Brief].
11. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177-78.
12. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the

First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State from criminalizing
possession of obscene material since it attempts to control a person's private
thoughts); see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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examination would also be articulated in the discourse of
neuroscience, a discourse that is playing an increasingly important
13 and how
role in our understanding of who we are as human beings
4
regulated.'
be
best
our lives together in society should
If the Justices' silence reflects a reluctance to lead First
Amendment jurisprudence into this realm of neuroscientific
discourse, they may learn that this can only be avoided for so long.
Whenever they do decide to take such a journey, their opinions and
conclusions may lead us to a very different understanding of what
13. The New York Times Magazine has, for example, devoted several
articles to neuroscientific issues over the past few years, in articles about topics
as diverse as the concept of "self," Chip Brown, The Man Who Mistook His
Wife for a Deer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 2, 2003, at 34 (analyzing how the
science of sleep disorders complicates explanations of a unified self); gender
roles, Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003,
at 42 (referring to possible biological explanations in article exploring
decisions by professional women to leave the workforce); and even marketing
strategies, Clive Thompson, There's a Sucker Born in Every Medial Prefrontal
Cortex, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 54 (describing the use of
specialized radiographic techniques to monitor subjects' responses to
advertisements); see also Andrew Sullivan, The He Hormone, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Apr. 2, 2000, at 46 (relaying a first-person account of the psychological
effects of testosterone therapy).
The lay scientific magazine Scientific American has also periodically
published articles discussing the implications of neuroscience on how we view
ourselves as persons. In fact, Scientific American recently published numerous
stories on the issue and devoted the cover to it. See, e.g., Special Issue: Better
Brains,SCI. AM., Sept. 2003, at 44-105.
14. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 388 (2002) (examining the validity of
categorizing criminal acts solely as voluntary or involuntary as we learn more
about insanity and how the brain works); Andrew E. Lelling, Comment,
Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1471, 1564 (1993) (claiming that advances in neuroscience are
challenging basic assumptions about the law and will lead to profound changes
in people's perspectives about themselves and society); Laura Reider,
Comment, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the
Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 289, 295 (1998) (arguing for a new version of the insanity defense based
on neuroscientific data); see also STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 22-42 (2001) (discussing how specific neural
networks may be involved in the development of certain metaphoric forms of
legal reasoning).
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we mean when, in the First Amendment context, we speak of
"incorporation." 5 Such a journey will have profound implications
for how we speak of the First Amendment in all contexts.
Part I of this Article outlines the facts of Sell and the Due
Process arguments put forth by Justice Breyer to support a limited
right to refuse psychiatric treatment. Part II briefly outlines the
cases and commentaries that have argued for a protected "freedom
of thought" or "autonomy" under the First Amendment. This part
will also detail the arguments used by Dr. Sell and others in support
of a First Amendment-based right to refuse unwanted psychotropic
medication.
Part III examines the limitations of metaphors of "control"
when they are used to justify First Amendment protections for this
right, while Part IV analyzes the applicability of and the
jurisprudential challenges inherent in metaphors of "invasion" to
describe such First Amendment protections. Finally, in light of
these discussions, Part V discusses the potentially revolutionary
consequences that the Court may need to consider in the future if
First Amendment jurisprudence comes to reflect our advancing
knowledge of neuroscience. This knowledge encompasses the
neuroscience of thought, how the brain processes information
designed to influence thought, and the speech arising from such
thought.
I. SELL AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Dr. Charles
was a dentist with a long history of
• •• Sell
16
psychiatric difficulties. He had been charged with multiple counts
of mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering, and

15. In constitutional law, "incorporation" refers to the process whereby
certain rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights may be asserted not only
against actions taken by the federal government, but also, via "incorporation"
into the Fourteenth Amendment, against actions taken by the individual states
as well. See

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

772-74

(2d ed. 1988). The speech clause of the First Amendment was incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927). Id. at 772.
16. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.
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eventually with the attempted murder of an FBI agent and a former
employee. 7 During the course of the pre-trial proceedings, the
federal magistrate in charge of his case questioned Dr. Sell's
competency to stand trial and ordered a psychiatric evaluation.
Eventually the Magistrate found Dr. Sell incompetent to stand trial
and ordered him into treatment. '9 After Dr. Sell refused to take the
antipsychotic medication recommended by his treatment team, the
government sought judicial permission to forcibly administer the
drugs.
The United States Supreme Court had twice previously
addressed the issue of forced antipsychotic medication.
In
Washington v. Harper,the Court held that convicted prisoners had
a liberty interest in being free from the forced administration of
antipsychotic medication.2 ' This liberty interest was to be balanced
against "the State's interests in providing appropriate medical
treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a
serious mental disorder represents to himself or others., 22 In
Riggins v. Nevada, the Court extended this liberty interest to
defendants facing trial for murder, holding that if the government
sought to compel competency through antipsychotic medication, it
must prove that "it [cannot] obtain an adjudication 2of
[a
3
defendant's] guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means.,
In the right-to-refuse-treatment cases, the argument for
protection of the body is straightforward. With the tacit or explicit

17. Id. at 170.
18. Id. at 170-71.
19. Id. Dr. Sell was admitted to the United States Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.
While there, his treating
psychiatrists recommended a trial of antipsychotic medications. Id.

20. Id.
21. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
22. Id. at 236. The Court did require that evidence be presented showing

that inmates are "dangerous to [themselves] or others and the treatment is in
the inmate[s'] medical interest." Id. at 227.
23. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). The Court reiterated
that the Harper standard was appropriate as alternative grounds in that the
"treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and,
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [a defendant's]
own safety or the safety of others." Id.
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permission of the State, a doctor would force physical substances
into the body of a patient, substances which then chemically
interact with the patient's neurons, causing changes in brain
functioning. It is a literal invasion of the body, leading to literal
changes in the body. Given the history of substantive due process
jurisprudence as a doctrine protecting physical choices, 24one can
understand how the Court has upheld a liberty interest in being free
from such coerced physical invasions.
With this jurisprudential background, Justice Breyer united
in Sell the holdings of the previous right-to-refuse treatment cases
into a more general standard, writing that
the Constitution permits the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs
to a mentally ill defendant facing serious
criminal charges in order to render that
defendant competent to stand trial, but only if
the treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that
may undermine the fairness of the trial, and,
taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is
necessary significantly to further important
governmental trial-related interests.2

24. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (protecting the
choice of sexual expression); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990) (protecting the choice to refuse end-of-life medical care); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting the choice to have an abortion);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the choice to use
contraception).
25. 539 U.S. at 179. In the months since the Sell decision came down,
Dr. Sell has shown no improvement in his condition. Douglas MacCourt &
Alan A. Stone, Caught in Limbo Between Law and Psychiatry, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES, June 2005, at 1. He has continued to refuse medication, and according
to Drs. MacCourt and Stone, his legal-and clinical-situation has apparently
"degenerated into a contest of wills" between Dr. Sell and federal prosecutors.
Id. at 9. There have also been reports of abuse of Dr. Sell at the hands of
prison guards, leading both authors to wonder whether the continuing legal
battles are only serving to reinforce Dr. Sell's beliefs about the injustice of the
legal system, all the while as he refuses any medical treatment which, at least
in theory, might be able to assuage some of his most severe anxiety states. Id.
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By adding the phrase "substantially unlikely to have side
effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial," the Court
included within the new standard the concern that Justice Kennedy
had raised in his concurrence in Riggins: that the government must
prove that the administration of the antipsychotic medication will
not interfere with the defendant's ability to assist with his or her
26
defense. In Sell, the Court concluded that the government had not
met its burden to prove the need to force the defendant to take
27
antipsychotic medication.
The Court has yet to rule on the applicability of this
substantive due process analysis to a situation in which
antipsychotic medications are to be administered forcibly to
persons who have been civilly, rather than criminally, committed
for treatment. Nevertheless, after Sell, one could suspect that the
Court may analyze civil cases using a similar standard. 8 If advocates
are to have any hope of finding arguments in support of strict
scrutiny review in civil cases, their most promising avenue still
appears to be analysis under the First Amendment.
II. SELL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. The FirstAmendment, "Freedom of Thought," and Autonomy
"Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds. 29 With these
words, Justice Marshall summarized an argument that, while not
often referenced explicitly in First Amendment jurisprudence,
26. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144-45 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
27. Id. at 183-86.
28. At oral argument, one of the Justices said to Dr. Sell's counsel: "So a
person who's in a mental hospital, civilly committed, and he's dangerous,
going to commit suicide or possibly kill someone, that the doctors in that civil
setting are forbidden to administer psychotic drugs? That's not my
understanding." Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Sell v. United States, 539
U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) (questioning Petitioner's counsel, Barry A.
Short).
29. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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nevertheless remains a powerful foundation for it. The First
Amendment protects those who wish to speak against some state
action since those who speak for the State rarely, if ever, need
protection. Then, by simple logic, if the State cannot, without
compelling reasons, control the content of what you say against the
action, then the State should not, without similarly compelling
reasons, control what information you have with which to formulate
the content of what you say. As Professor Tribe has noted,
understood in this way, the First Amendment prohibits the
"governmental shaping of the mind" by the "screening [of] the
sources of [persons'] consciousness. "
Justice Marshall's quotation comes from the case always
referenced when advocates argue for a First Amendment right to
"freedom of thought": Stanley v. Georgia.!
In that case,
invalidating a man's conviction for the possession of pornographic
materials in his own home, Justice Marshall wrote that governments
violate the First Amendment when they attempt to "control men's
minds" by trying to "control the moral content of a person's
thoughts. 3 2 It is important to note that Stanley and cases like it
limit the state's ability to restrict access to materials about which
one may wish to ponder.33 It is in this sense, then, that the Stanley
interpretation of the First Amendment protects "freedom of
thought." Stanley says nothing about the pondering itself. In
Justice Marshall's memorable words, "[i]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch."' 3 Stanley, therefore, is a "pre-brain" opinion, if
30.

TRIBE,

supra note 15, at 1321-22.

31. 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
32. Id. at 565. Later the Court did go on to affirm the constitutionality of
statutes designed to prohibit the distribution of materials protected under
Stanley. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971). Nevertheless,
the idea that "the First Amendment right of the individual to be free from
governmental programs of thought control, however such programs might be
justified in terms of permissible state objectives," has remained intact. Id. at
359-60 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. "It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
34. Id. at 565.
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you will. What happens after the content of a book or film enters
one's brain, and what the state can or cannot do once that happens,
is not addressed by the case.
More recently, scholars have been arguing how and to what
extent the First Amendment protects the "autonomy" of the
individual. Professor Fried has noted, for example, that:
[N]o such necessity requires, indeed selfrespect forbids, that I cede to the state the
authority to limit my use of my rational powers
...

the state has no claim to dominion over our

minds: what we believe, what we are persuaded
to believe, and (derivatively) what others may
try to persuade us to believe. 36
Even though references are not usually made to Stanley or
"freedom of thought" arguments in these discussions, the idea that
the state cannot, without compelling reasons, control your thinking
by restricting what you can think about remains a core value
universally accepted by all.37 Restricting what a person can think
about and restricting a person's actual thoughts are two very
35. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence.A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233-34 (1992); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 875 (1994) (claiming that
autonomy is best classified as either descriptive, the impact of causal factors
on an individual's liberty; or ascriptive, describing an individual's sovereignty
over moral choices); Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence,32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 160-61 (1997) (contending that protecting an
individual's autonomy should include a respect for other people's individual
autonomy).
36. Fried, supra note 35, at 233.
37. Instead, writers tend to disagree either with how to conceptualize
autonomy, e.g., whether to deviate from the standard classification of positive
and negative liberty interests, Fallon, supra note 35, at 876-77, or with how to
define adequate compelling reasons that do not interfere with the "moral[]
and legal[] obligat[ion] to use speech in a manner that respects the thought
processes of others." Wells, supra note 35, at 196; cf Barry P. McDonald, The
FirstAmendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right
to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 249 (2004)
(exploring how Speech Clause jurisprudence may not prove to be an adequate
basis for the protection and/or regulation of new forms of information).

192

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol.4

different matters. Neuroscience has little to say about the former.
It has much to say about the latter.
B. The FirstAmendment and Coerced Administration of

PsychotropicAgents
Using Stanley and other cases and commentaries as support,
Dr. Sell and several amici curiae did argue for a First Amendment
basis for the Court's decision in Sell.38 The most comprehensive
arguments in support of this view were made in the amicus curiae
brief of the Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics (CCLE), an
advocacy group out of Davis, California.3 9
The CCLE often uses the word "alter" when describing the
effects of psychotropic medications. Such medications affect the
functioning of neurons, altering them in some way, if only by
changing their chemical environment. Mental processes, whether
cognitive or emotional, arise out of neuronal activity. Therefore,
psychotropic medications alter mental processes. Even the most
38. See supra note 9; see also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of
Eastern Missouri as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6-9, Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) [hereinafter Mo. ACLU Brief]. The
only substantive mention of the First Amendment at oral argument, however,
was when Deputy Solicitor General Michael R. Dreeben, counsel for the
United States, answered Justice O'Connor's question by stating that he
thought the First Amendment claims ought to be balanced against the
government's interests under heightened judicial review. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 28, at 34-35.
39. The CCLE describes its mission as follows:
The CCLE is a nonprofit education, law, and policy
center working in the public interest to foster cognitive
liberty - the right of each individual to think
independently, to use the full spectrum of his or her
mind, and to have autonomy over his or her own brain
chemistry. The CCLE encourages social policies that
respect and protect the full potential and dignity of the
human intellect.
Brief for Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 1, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (No. 02-5664)
[hereinafter CCLE Brief].
40. Some form of the word "alter" is used a total of twenty-nine times in
the brief, often in a form of the phrase "mind-altering." Id. at 1-29.
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ardent supporter of the forced. medication
of psychiatric patients
41
could not quibble with this claim.
As the brief goes on, however, the CCLE begins to use the
word "control," first by referencing Stanley42 and other famous First
Amendment cases that express various Justices' concerns over the
government's ability to infringe on "the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from official control. 4 3 The brief then

implies that psychiatrists who use psychotropic medications to
restore competency to criminal defendants are doing so to control
the defendants' thoughts."4 In other parts of the brief, the CCLE
writes of such psychiatrists
as "commandeering"4 5 and
"suppressing"

6

defendants'

thoughts

by

"invading,

47

and

41. At least one member of the Court recognized, though, the difference
between the denotation and the connotation of the phrase "mind-altering."
The Justice said to Dr. Sell's counsel, "I imagine that the slogan, mind-altering
drugs, is not a very good slogan for present purposes, because there are a lot
of seriously ill people whom these drugs do help a lot," to which counsel
responded, "That's correct." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at
21 (emphasis added).
42. CCLE Brief, supra note 39, at 6 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 565 (1969)).
43. Id. at 5 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (holding that local authorities cannot compel schoolchildren to
salute the flag)).
44. See, e.g., id. at 10 ("Since the advent of powerful antipsychotic drugs
in the 1950s (as well as other technologies... ), the government now does have
the capability to 'control the inward workings of the mind."') (contrasting the
holding of Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942)); id. at 16 ("The absence
of such an unambiguous bright-line rule at the jurisprudential crossroads of
psychiatry and technology, exposes the very foundation of the First
Amendment to erosion, and grants 'government the power to control men's
minds."') (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565); id. at 20-21 ("Technological
progress is indeed turning 'mind control' fiction into fact, with the possibility
that neurochemical drugs or other technology could be deployed as tools of
individual and social control.").
45. CCLE Brief, supra note 39, at 12 ("By forcing a person to take a
mind-altering drug against his or her will, the government is commandeering
that person's mind, and forcibly changing his or her very ability to formulate
particular thoughts.") (emphasis added).
46. Id. ("By manipulating the way that Dr. Sell thinks, through the
forcible act of administering mind-altering drugs to him, the state commits a
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"intruding"4 into their brain with psychotropic medications. In
their briefs, Dr. Sell and other amici curiae use synonymous terms:
Dr. Sell has an interest in his own thought
process that is separate and distinct from his
right to communicate those thoughts to others.
The government's efforts are directed to
changing the manner in which Dr. Sell thinks.
The restriction is pre-content. As this Court has
found: 'First Amendment freedoms are most in
danger when the government seeks to control
thought or to justify its laws for that permissible
end. 49
type of cognitive censorship - suppressing Dr. Sell's own thoughts in favor of
state-approved, drug-induced, 'normal,' 'acceptable,' or 'competent'
thoughts.") (emphasis added). The CCLE stated:
Even in the absence of physical and mental "side
effects," the fact remains that antipsychotic drugs
strongly affect thought processes. The First
Amendment should be read to allocate to the
individual, as opposed to the government, the final say
about whether to manipulate his or her own brain for
the purpose of occasioning or suppressingthoughts.
Id. at 11 n.6 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 23-24 ("[T]he First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
thought demands an answer by this Court that establishes unequivocal limits
on the government's power to invade the inner workings of a person's mind.")
(emphasis added).
48. CCLE Brief, supra note 39, at 24-25 ("[A] bare determination of a
defendant's incompetence to stand trial, regardless of the 'seriousness' of the
offense, may not, standing alone, serve as the overriding justification for the
state directly intruding into a person's brain and manipulating how he or she
thinks.") (emphasis added).
49. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002)); see also Mo. ACLU Brief, supra note
38, at 2 ("In upholding the trial court's decision, a split panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit failed to consider Dr. Sell's First and Fifth
Amendment interests to be free from the government's control of his
thoughts, emotions, and ability to communicate with his lawyers.").
Since the Sell decision, commentators critical of the Court's avoidance of
the First Amendment issue have continued to use these words in their
critiques. See, e.g., Aaron R. Dias, Constitutional Law: Just Say Yes: Sell v.
United States and Inadequate Limitations on the Forced Medication of
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Metaphorically speaking, ° psychiatrists are "doing" bad
things "in places" where they should not, according to these
advocates, be allowed to "go."'"
For one to argue that a First Amendment analysis covers
territory not covered by a substantive due process analysis, one
must emphasize that the physical invasion alters the products of
neuronal activities, the mind. Stated that simply, the physical
invasion does do that. But, also stated that simply, it is hard to
argue that one is dealing with an interest that is more than a

protected liberty interest. Metaphysical questions notwithstanding,

Defendants in Order to Render Competence for Trial, 55 S.C. L. REV. 517, 527
(2005) ("Such forcible medication is tantamount to the government's
controlling its citizens' minds. Few propositions are more frightening.");
Megan Quinlan, Note, ForcibleMedication and PersonalAutonomy: The Case
of Charles Thomas Sell, 84 B.U. L. REV. 275, 291-92 (2004) ("[Antipsychotic
medications] commandeer an individual's mind and forcibly change the
manner in which that individual formulates and processes thought.");
Elizabeth G. Schultz, Note: Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts: Forced
Medication to Achieve Trial Competency in the Wake of Sell v. United States,
38 AKRON L. REV. 503, 532 (2005) ("Mental health treatments that 'coerce
beliefs, attitudes, and mental processes' involve potential violations of First
Amendment principles.") (citing Winick, supra note 8, at 6).
50. Cf Rodney J.S. Deaton, Law and Psychiatry, Metaphorically
Speaking, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 221 (2003) (outlining several different
metaphor systems psychiatrists use when talking about their work in a legal
context).
51. At various times, some of the Justices have used similar metaphors.
For example, Justice Stevens bolstered his claim that treatment refusals should
have been accorded strict scrutiny review, saying that "[t]he liberty of citizens
to resist the administration of mind altering drugs arises from our Nation's
most basic values." Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 238 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Stevens wrote of mind "control"
(quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969)), as well as of mind
"manipulation" (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights
and Int'l Orgs. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 106
(1983) (focusing on the abuse of psychiatry in the former Soviet Union)).
Harper,494 U.S. at 238 n.3. At oral argument in Sell, Justice Kennedy asked
the Government's counsel, "what is the authority of the Government to go out
and force [a voluntarily-admitted patient] to be medicated so that he behaves
the way the Government wants him to at trial?" Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 28, at 28. Justice Kennedy's implication is that he
assumes that psychiatrists could indeed deliver up such behavior.
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mind arises out of body, the body must be constitutionally
protected from unwarranted government coercion, and it is-under
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause.52
To avoid the specter of the Due Process clause in these
forced treatment situations, one must do exactly what the CCLE
did in its brief: switch from literal arguments to metaphoric ones.
One must claim that through the literal invasion of the medication,
one is metaphorically "controlling" and/or "invading" the mind.53
This shift into metaphor changes the argument significantly.
At first glance, this may not appear to be the case because there is a
rhetorical allure to the argument. Defendants have been found
incompetent. The whole purpose of giving medication would seem
to be to change defendants' ways of thinking from incompetent to
competent. Psychiatrists try to alter the thought processes of the
defendants, thereby exerting some "control" over their brain
functioning. Using a "control" metaphor, thoughts are things that
are, depending on one's orientation, either "altered" or "replaced."
Even in the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychiatric
52. Even the Gomes court, which was not hostile to the defendant's First
Amendment claims, see supra note 7, wrote that:
To the extent that Gomes's concerns about the drugs'
effect on his mental processes and personality are an
expression of fears that the antipsychotic medication
will "alter the chemical balance in [his] brain, leading
to changes, intended to be beneficial, in his . . .
cognitive processes," Gomes's First Amendment rights
are in large part co-extensive with his due process
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication.
United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 84 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992)). For an interesting argument that the
Fourth Amendment should be used as a basis upon which to ground
defendants' rights to refuse involuntary treatment under these conditions, see

Rebekah W. Page, Comment, Forcible Medication and the Fourth
Amendment: A New Framework for Protecting Nondangerous Mentally Ill
Pretrial Detainees Against Unreasonable Governmental Intrusion into the
Body, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (2005).

53. See WINTER, supra note 14, at 43-68 (describing a theory of the role
of metaphor in legal reasoning). See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980) (describing a theory of the

structuring role of metaphor in human thought and its persuasiveness in
thought and action).
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Association and the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law,
the psychiatrists in these associations do not question these
underlying metaphors. They simply seek to put a more positive
spin on them. In quoting psychiatrist Dr. Alan Felthous and his
colleagues, the brief contends that "Rather than mind restricting,
the medication is mind liberating."5 4 If one is liberating, one is
controlling some thing long enough so that something else is set
free.
What some people claim psychiatrists are doing by giving
psychotropic medications and what psychiatrists are actually doing,
however, turn out to be quite different matters. In shifting from the
literal to the metaphoric, people making such claims become
susceptible to a significant category mistake. This shift causes one
to overstate the effects of forced psychiatric medication-and to
understate the effects of psychological treatment in general. To
understand this, let us examine each of the two major metaphor
categories already noted: "control" metaphors5 and "invasion"
metaphors 56 In doing so, we will find that "control" metaphors tell
us something about the right to refuse treatment, while "invasion"
metaphors tell us something about the First Amendment.

54. APA/AAPL Brief, supra note 10, at 26 (quoting Alan R. Felthous et
al., Are Persecutory Delusions Amenable to Treatment?, 29 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 461, 466 (2001)); see also Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S.
Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and
Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983) (describing in detail the positive effects of
antipsychotic medication). Using a similar metaphor, Dr. Douglas Mossman
argues that due to advances in the safety and efficiency of newer drugs,

"[c]hemical straitjacketing is rapidly becoming an unusual phenomenon for
patients who take antipsychotic medication." Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling

the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the
PharmacologicalTreatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1156
(2002).

55. See supra notes 39-43 and 46.
56. See supra notes 44-45.
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III. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT AND CONTROL
METAPHORS: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PHARMACOLOGIC

When one uses metaphors of "control," one overstates what
psychiatrists are accomplishing with psychotropic medication. Even
if certain psychiatrists may be hoping to control the thoughts of
defendants, there is no evidence to support that they are doing
anything of the kind.
Dr. Shitij Kapur of the University of Toronto has written
the most current, cogent explanation of what actually occurs when a
person takes antipsychotic medication. He describes the psychotic
experience as one of "aberrant salience," which he explains as
follows:
[I]n psychosis there is a dysregulated dopamine
transmission that leads to stimulus-independent
release of dopamine.
This neurochemical
aberration usurps the normal process of
contextually driven salience attribution and
leads to aberrant assignment of salience to
external objects and internalrepresentations.'8

In other words, a brain cell communicates with another
brain cell by means of naturally-occurring chemicals
(neurotransmitters) that are released from the first cell. The
neurotransmitter combines with proteins on the second cell
(receptors) to induce or alter the functioning of the second cell.
Dopamine is one such neurotransmitter, and it has long been
implicated both in the etiology and in the treatment of psychosis. 59
57. Shitij Kapur, Psychosis as a State of Aberrant Salience: A Framework
Linking Biology, Phenomenology, and Pharmacology in Schizophrenia, 160
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 13 (2003). Dr. Kapur's article was a special review article
in arguably the premier psychiatric journal, the American Journal of
Psychiatry published by the American Psychiatric Association. Articles such

as this one are subject to rigorous peer review and therefore represent
examples of the most well thought-out and current arguments in the field of
psychiatry.

58. Id. at 15.
59. Anissa Abi-Dargham, Do We Still Believe in the Dopamine
Hypothesis?
New
Data Bring New
Evidence, 7
INT.
J.
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (Supp. $1) (2004).
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In addition, dopamine has been implicated as a neurotransmitter
important for the experience of pleasure and motivation. 6°
It is dopamine's role in the experience of pleasure and
motivation that, in Dr. Kapur's view, helps explain its role in the
etiology of psychosis. 6' Dopamine is not necessarily involved in the
processes underlying whether one has a particular thought or
perception. It appears primarily important in making those mental
62
events matter.
If dopamine release becomes dysregulated, a
process the etiology of which remains unknown, then it is as if the
brain is saying "pay attention!" to ideas and perceptions which may
not ordinarily merit such focus. As Dr. Kapur puts it:
It is postulated that before experiencing
psychosis, patients develop an exaggerated
release of dopamine, independent of and out of
synchrony with the context. This leads to the
assignment of inappropriate salience and
motivational significance to external and
internal stimuli.
At its earliest stage this
induces a somewhat novel and perplexing state
marked by exaggerated importance of certain
percepts and ideas . . . . Most patients report
that something in the world around them is
changing, leaving them somewhat confused and
looking for an explanation .... If this were an
60. Kapur, supra note 57, at 13-15.
61. After reviewing different hypotheses about the role of dopamine in
the brain's reward system, Dr. Kapur argues:
[D]opamine mediates the conversion of the neural
representation of an external stimulus from a neutral
and cold bit of information into an attractive or
aversive entity. In particular, [it] is seen as a critical
component in the 'attribution of salience,' a process
whereby events and thoughts come to grab attention,
drive action, and influence goal-directed behavior
because of their association with reward or
punishment.
Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 15 ("Dopamine mediates the process of salience acquisition and
expression, but under normal circumstances it does not create this process.").
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isolated incident, perhaps it would be no
different from the everyday life experience of
having one's attention drawn to or distracted
by something that is momentarily salient and
then passes. What is unique about the aberrant
saliences that lead to psychosis is their
persistence in the absence of sustaining stimuli
... . From days to years (the prodrome),
patients continue in this state of subtly altered
experience
of the world, accumulating
experiences of aberrant salience without
a clear
63
reason or explanation for the patient.
Antipsychotic medications are antidopaminergic agents
that, depending on the particular properties of the particular drug,
block effective dopamine transmission between cells and thereby
"lead[] to an attenuation of the salience of these ideas and
perceptions." ' Even though Dr. Kapur admits that these ideas
remain hypotheses, they are quite consistent with clinical
observations dating65 to the introduction of antipsychotic medication
back in the 1950s.

63. Id. According to his counsel at oral argument, Dr. Sell had "thoughts
that are plausible, thoughts that can conceivably come true, [but] probably
won't. . . he believes the FBI is out to discredit or harm him... [and] because
of his delusion he can't focus on the trial [or] on anything else other than the
FBI." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 11-12.
64. Kapur, supra note 57, at 16-17.
65. The following observations made by Dr. Kapur, square not only with
my personal experience as a treating psychiatrist, but also with my discussions
with colleagues and students over the years:
[A]ntipsychotics do not primarily change thoughts or
ideas; instead, they provide a neurochemical milieu
wherein new aberrant saliences are less likely to form
and previously aberrant saliences are more likely to
extinguish ....Patients do not immediately abandon
the psychotic idea or percept but report that the idea
or percept "doesn't bother me as much." In fact, for
many patients this is as good a resolution as
antipsychotics can provide. This concept is implicitly
accepted by the field, as on most rating scales for
psychosis the severity of psychosis is rated not so much
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Given this, one can then better understand the complexities
that one faces when one uses terms such as "control,"
"commandeer," and "suppress" to describe metaphorically the
actions of antipsychotic medications. First, one must face exactly
what is being controlled by these medications. Second, one must
face how what is being controlled does and does not affect the
particular ideas and perceptions defendants bring to their cases.
A. Aberrant Salience and Freedom of Thought
Antipsychotic medications do not control the specific
content of defendants' mental processes; they only alter the
intensity with which defendants experience those mental
processes. 66 It is true that by reducing dopaminergic influence
within the brain, psychiatrists can generally be assured that the
intensity will decrease and thus that they will alter defendants'
mental process in a specific direction. The better metaphor for such
a process, however, is "set in motion." By adjusting dosages,
psychiatrists may be able to control, in a gross fashion, the degree
of decrease, but such control never reaches a degree of exactness
such that "commandeer" would even approximate the resulting
state of affairs.
The Sell standard now includes the phrase "substantially
unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the
on the content of the idea/percept as on the degree to
which it preoccupies the mind and affects behavior.
Thus, antipsychotics at first remove not the core
content of the symptom but the degree to which the
symptoms occupy the mind, distress the patient, and
drive action. It is only later, over the ensuing weeks,
that the fundamental content of the delusions and

hallucinations is deconstructed and (only for some)
recedes entirely from awareness.
Id. at 17. For early examples of the recognition of this phenomenon, see J.
Elkes & Charmian Elkes, Effect of Chlorpromazine on the Behaviour of
Chronically Overactive Psychotic Patients,2 BRIT. MED. J. 560 (1954), and N.
William Winkelman, Chlorpromazine in the Treatment of Neuropsychiatric
Disorders,155 JAMA 18 (1954).
66. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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trial," 67 meaning that prosecutors must now put forward credible
medical evidence that the proposed medication treatment will not
interfere with defendants' abilities to participate meaningfully in
their proceedings. 68 It has long been known that antipsychotic
medications can cause individuals to feel less engaged in life,
resulting in states described as "'neuroleptic-induced dysphoria,'
'decreased motivational drive,' or 'neuroleptic-induced deficit
state.' '' 69 If such effects could undermine the fairness of the trial,
then they must be shown in each case not to do so substantially.
The Court has recognized the important role such physical states
could play in a defendant obtaining a fair trial• -70 by incorporating
the concern into a Due Process basis for the right.
Nevertheless, advocates could still claim a First Amendment
basis for the right in civil cases, because the decision to medicate is
never thought content-neutral. Psychiatrists seek to decrease
aberrant salience after they have heard defendants speak of
delusions and hallucinations. 7' You speak, you get the diagnosis,
you get the medication.
Professor Winick has written that "the distinction between
sane and disordered thought is elusive, particularly in view of the
67. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003); see supra notes 25-27

and accompanying text.
68. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183 (stating the question a court facing this issue
must address: "Has the Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects,
the possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular
course of antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for that treatment
sufficiently important to overcome the individual's protected interest in
refusing it?").
69. Kapur, supra note 57, at 18. "Neuroleptic" is another term used to

refer to antipsychotic medication.
70. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
71. As Dr. Kapur points out:
So long as ... delusions and hallucinations ... remain
private affairs, they are not an illness by society's
standards. It is only when the patient chooses to share
these mental experiences with others, or when these
thoughts and percepts become so salient that they start
affecting the behavior of the individual, that they cross
over into the domain of clinical psychosis.

Id. at 16.
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imprecision of the diagnostic categories used in defining mental
illness, as well as of the lack of consistency by clinicians in their
application. ' By itself, such a statement is probably too skeptical
of the day-to-day realities of psychiatric practice. No matter what
one's political or social orientation may be, most persons would
have little problem labeling as "disordered" thoughts of huge
conspiracies by multiple governmental agencies being promulgated
specifically upon a single individual who has not distinguished
himself or herself in any way from anyone else in the country. Yet
if one were to speak of huge conspiracies by multiple governmental
agencies being promulgated upon individuals who have not
distinguished themselves in any way from anyone else in the
country, one could easily find persons - most likely, many - who
would heartily assent to the proposition. By labeling an idea as
"delusional" or a perception as "hallucinatory," one has already
made value judgments that are always, at least to some degree,
laden with cultural assumptions.
Still, even if psychiatrists are not using content-neutral
criteria in identifying defendants to receive the intervention, they
are clearly intervening with medications that are content-neutral in
their effects. By themselves, antipsychotic medications will not
change the contents of a defendant's ideas or perceptions. At most
(and not invariably) they will only alter the intensity with which
those beliefs are held. For advocates to claim that the First
Amendment should provide an underpinning for the right beyond
that provided by the Due Process Clause, they must argue that the
First Amendment not only protects what one thinks, but also how
strongly one thinks about what one thinks. One would not just be
seeking protection for "freedom of thought." One would also be
asking for a "freedom of intense thought." A colorable argument,
perhaps, but one should be quite skeptical about the prospect of
getting the current Supreme Court to open up First Amendment
jurisprudence to such a possibility. 73
72. Winick, supra note 8, at 46.
73. As Professor Tribe has pointed out, such a doctrine would open up
the possibility that governments could not regulate the usage of illicit
psychoactive drugs such as cocaine and hallucinogens. TRIBE, supra note 15, at
1324. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (holding that the
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That is not to say that a future Court might not be
interested in the argument, but almost certainly that will depend
upon what possibilities advancements in neuropharmacology may
bring us. In their brief, the CCLE worries about the "dark prospect
. . [that t]echnological progress is indeed turning 'mind control'
fiction into fact, with the possibility that neurochemical drugs or
other technology could be deployed as tools of individual and social
control. 74 They speak of "brain fingerprinting" machines 75 and
nanotechnologies of insertable monitoring devices, 76 and they
remind the Court of the specter of "Soma," the mind-controlling
substance used in Aldous Huxley's dystopic novel, Brave New
*

World.77
government has the right to enforce drug laws as the firing of a state employee
for using a hallucinogen in a religious rite did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment).
Moreover, this would do nothing to reduce the dueling perspectives of the
right-to-refuse treatment debate; it would only change the location of the
battlefield. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. When one is concerned
about "freedom of thought," one focuses on the person who is free or not free
to think. This leads one to the problem noted by one legal commentator: "[I]t
is not clear which identity - medicated or unmedicated - the law should defend
when [persons are] not simply erratic, but dysfunctional." Leading Cases,
supra note 3, at 315.
In contrast, if one were to be concerned about "freedom of intense
thought," one would focus not on who the person is, but on what the person
has. Furthermore, one would not only ask about what thoughts the person
has, but one would also have to ask about the quality of those thoughts,
turning the whole matter into a different duel. One camp (psychiatrists)
would say the person's thoughts are too intense, the other (advocates) that
they are just right (or at least, for the particular person, right enough). As
always, everyone wishes to protect the value of what Professor Michael
Shapiro calls "mental integrity."
Michael H. Shapiro, Constitutional
Adjudication and Standards of Review Under Pressure from Biological
Technologies, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 351, 440 (2001). It is simply that advocates
believe that they are preserving that integrity, while psychiatrists believe that

they are restoring it.
74. CCLE Brief, supra note 39, at 20-21 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 21.
76. Id. at 19 n.15.
77. Id. at 21 n.17. (Soma is the pleasure inducing drug that dopes human
beings into a feeling of universal happiness so that the powers-that-be can
effectively control society.).
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Whether or not a real-life "Soma" has indeed already been
discovered, we do know one thing: the antipsychotic medications
currently available are not Soma. As Dr. Kapur notes, "[n]either
normal volunteers nor patients find antipsychotics pleasant; in both
populations they are associated with a plethora of unpleasant
subjective effects. 7 ' This is a fact which daily complicates the lives
of psychiatrists and patients as they work, even when cooperatively,
79
to reduce the usually-terrifying effects of psychotic symptoms.
Given that antipsychotic medication is content-neutral in its
effect, advocates must then face how alterations in ideas and
perceptions actually occur. In cases involving competence to stand
trial, the whole purpose of giving the medications may be to alter
defendants' ideas and perceptions so that they can state an
understanding of the legal process and assist their counsels in their
78. Kapur, supra note 57, at 17-18; cf. Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 314
("The medicated patient may think more efficiently but still not feel like
himself.").
79. Id. at 18 ("Perhaps this dampening of pleasurable drives is why
patients with schizophrenia have a much higher incidence of drug abuse, selfmedication and other ways of overcoming this dampening."). For purposes of
the right to refuse treatment, this is an important point, for legal
commentators often worry that "[p]sychotropic drugs ... can be accompanied

by a lessening of normal anxiety, and can permit a 'don't care' mental status
rather than responses based on self-protection." David M. Siegel et al., Old
Law Meets New Medicine: Revisiting Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of
the Criminal Defendant, 2001 Wisc. L. REV. 307, 347 (2001). First, decrease of
anxiety does not equate with decrease of motivation, for one certainly does
not need to be anxious to be motivated. Second, "dampening of pleasurable
drives" is a different matter altogether from some hypothetical emotional
anesthesia.
Based on my personal clinical experience, I would agree with Dr. Kapur.
No matter what one's problem, people do not like the side effects he
describes-and they know it.
If defendants (and patients) say that they
"don't care" to involve themselves in matters when they take antipsychotic
medications, they say this because they are tired or because they are irritable,
not because they have been rendered docile or manipulable. The "don't care"
attitude could still pose a problem for the legal proceedings and for "self
protection," and therefore the government would still have to prove that the
administration of drugs is "substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial." Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179
(2003). That said, no one takes an antipsychotic medication and ends up in
some sort of pleasurable trance.
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defense. The actual alteration, though, is not accomplished with
the bodily invasion of a medication. It is accomplished through
speech itself. Antipsychotic medication may make defendants
more amenable to considering alternatives to their ideas and
perceptions, but only speech and interpersonal processes bring
about those actual alternatives within their minds. This is as much
a fact of daily clinical life as it is of daily legal life.' Restoring
competency is therefore a matter more of education and persuasion
than it is of pharmacology. One would be hard pressed to argue
that defendants have a First Amendment right to prevent their
psychiatrists from trying to persuade them to accept certain
viewpoints about "reality" in order to enhance their chances of
proceeding more speedily through the legal process. As Professor
Winick points out, a defendant always "retains a veto over the
ability of the verbal techniques to effect changes in attitudes and
behavior."81

Professor Winick's observation, however, opens up a far
more complicated implication of these First Amendment arguments
for the jurisprudence not only of the right-to-refuse treatment
doctrine, but for the entire doctrine of freedom of speech as well.
In the light of the same neuroscience that explicates the effects of
antipsychotic medications, one cannot so easily brush aside
arguments that psychiatrists "invade" the minds of defendants.
They do not, however, invade with their medications. They invade
with their words.

80. Dr. Kapur writes:
Patients who have been psychotic for some time
incorporate their psychotic beliefs into their larger
cognitive schemas. In such a situation, blocking the
neurochemical abnormality (no matter how quickly
and completely) will only take away the driving force
but will not demolish the schemas already constructed.
Improvement of psychosis, although assisted by drugs,
finally involves psychological strategies that have
timelines of weeks and months, rather than seconds
and minutes.
Kapur, supra note 57, at 17.
81. Winick, supra note 8, at 83.
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IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT AND INVASION METAPHORS:
THE PHYSICALITY OF THE INTERPERSONAL

To use a metaphor of "invasion," one has understated the
First Amendment implications of other mental health treatments
which may be forced on an individual: verbal treatments. Patients
may or may not be able to resist verbal treatments more easily than
somatic treatments. When using an "invasion" metaphor, one is
not worried so much about the invasion of a medication. One is
worried about the invasion of the ideas that come after the
medication has been given.
The only commentator who has addressed
the
constitutionality of forced verbal treatments at any length is
Professor Bruce Winick, who has analyzed the First Amendment
implications both of psychotherapy and of coerced counseling
programs." It is useful to examine these analyses separately, as
psychotherapy reveals the true physical implications of a
neuroscientific discourse of the First Amendment, while coerced
counseling reveals the true legal implications of such an discourse.
A. The FirstAmendment and Psychotherapy
Winick's analysis of the First Amendment implications of
psychotherapy is so short, it can be reproduced here in full:
At the lower end of the intrusiveness
continuum are the verbal techniquespsychoanalysis, psychotherapy, counseling, and
educational
programs.
These
verbal
techniques, unlike the behavioral therapies,
usually focus upon changing thought processes,
emotions, and perceptions. Moreover, when
successful, they can have a massive impact
upon attitudes, beliefs, and personality.
Nevertheless, the verbal techniques work in
essentially a non-intrusive fashion. Those
compelled to participate in a verbal therapy
82. Id. at 83-85.
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program who seek to resist attitudinal or
personality change seem readily able to
frustrate these approaches and avoid their
effects simply by withholding cooperation.
1. Psychotherapy
Psychotherapy works slowly, affording the patients time to
contemplate the meaning of behavior change and to accept or resist
such change.
Unlike with the organic therapies, which are
incapable of being resisted, the patient retains a veto over the
ability of the verbal techniques to effect changes in attitudes and
behavior. "[W]e imagine ourselves as patients to be free agents
throughout the process, free to reject it and free to leave with no
more scar than in any other human transaction." A patient who
seeks to resist the effects of psychotherapy can thus totally frustrate
treatment by withholding his cooperation. The "fundamental rule"
of psychotherapy requires the patient to communicate openly and
candidly with his therapist. The therapeutic process cannot
progress if the patient is unwilling to play this role. Trust is an
indispensable condition for successful therapy. Moreover, even if
the patient does cooperate in at least the surface rituals of the
therapeutic process, he can effectively avoid the gradual and nonintrusive effects of psychotherapy with a minimal degree of mental
resistance. "[I]n the psychotherapy scheme one may go through
treatment as a form of game playing, such as showing up for
appointments and even making verbal utterances, in the absence of
the type and degree of commitment required for a meaningful
therapeutic relationship." A patient who is resistant to therapy can
83
thus avoid its effects even if compelled to play the role of patient.
Professor's Winick's arguments depend for their cogency on
one phrase: "non-intrusive effects." 84 He appears to equate effects

83. Id.

84. Id. at 83. The CCLE uses similar language in its brief: "far less
intrusive therapies, such as psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, counseling, group
therapy, and a panoply of behavior therapies have yet to be tried in the instant
case." CCLE Brief, supra note 39, at 29.
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with "changing thought processes, emotions, and perceptions.
Furthermore, he appears to equate changes with "attitudinal" or
"personality change[s]," which are the type of changes therapists
hope will result. Understood this way, one can see that his
argument has a certain force. If one is comparing the possibility of
someone with a free will resisting an idea to someone with a body
resisting a exogenous chemical, then yes, one can conclude that it is
easier to resist an idea rather than medicine, at least in the short
term.
But notice the metaphor that Professor Winick is using in
reference to ideas: "resist." One has to resist something. Before
one can resist something, one must see it and think about it. Only
then can one decide whether to avoid it, frustrate it, veto it,
withhold something from it, or cooperate with it. A lot of work is
being done. One could say that such work is just mental work, but
mental work always arises out of neuronal work. In psychotherapy,
exogenous chemicals (medications) are not combining with proteins
located
on
neurons.
Instead,
endogenous
chemicals
(neurotransmitters) are being mobilized to combine with (perhaps)
different proteins on neurons to accomplish the physical processes
out of which arise all the thoughts, resistances, avoidances, and so
forth.
Precisely because such neuronal work is going on, another
set of neurotransmitters is activated to combine with different
proteins on different neurons to assure that another very important
task occurs: memoryY By inducing memory circuitry, patients will
remember the ideas that therapists keep placing in front of them, as
well as remember all the brain work being done with them. In fact,
they will almost certainly never be able to forget these ideas. Can
the patients ignore them? Yes, but more neurons have to be
activated to do this. Can patients forget many, if not most of the
details of these ideas? Possibly, but still more neurons will be
activated.
But can patients forget the ideas that are being
85. Winick, supra note 8, at 83.
86. Id.
87. See generally DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE
BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST (1996) (discussing the neurobiology and

phenomenology of memory).
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repeatedly placed in front of them? No. Even if one wishes to
argue the possible "repression" of these memories, still more
neurons would have to be activated for that function.8
All of these neuronal processes are brought about by the
"invasion" - or to modify one of Professor Winick's words, the
"intrusion" - of the words of the therapist working with the patient.
Thoughts and ideas engendered by those words are physically
encoded into literal neuronal changes that then are managed by the
memory system of the brain, forcing neuronal mechanisms to
process the words and ideas.
This processing ranges from
attitudinal and behavioral change to ignoring. If one is going to
talk about "invasion" as a metaphor for the First Amendment
implications of mental health treatment, then the words of the
psychiatrist do not just "invade" but "colonize" the mind of the
patient. Since medications have a natural half-life, meaning that
they eventually break down chemically and are excreted from the
body, their ability to impact treatment vanishes once the level of
medication is below a certain threshold level. The only residue
that always remains from an episode of forced medication is the
interpersonal residue of the episode itself. Memories of words,
memories of interactions-these stick around. Practitioners who
give forced medication regret that fact.
Memories of such
interactions are never pleasant. In contrast, psychotherapists count
on their words sticking around. It is the nature of their business.
88. A classic definition for "repression" as a psychoanalytic concept is
"an operation whereby the subject attempts to repel, or to confine to the
unconscious, representations (thoughts, images, memories) which are bound
to an instinct." JEAN LAPLANCHE & JEAN-BERTRAND PONTALIS, THE

LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 390 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., The
Hogarth Press Ltd. 1973) (1967) (emphasis added).
89. This is not to say that the changes induced in the body necessarily go
away with the excretion of the medication. For example, one of the most
infamous long-term side effects of certain psychotropic medications is tardive
dyskinesia, a permanent change in muscular functioning (involuntary and
abnormal movements of the tongue, jaw, trunk, and extremities) caused by
antipsychotic medications. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 1, at 803-05. But longterm side effects arise from the physical invasion of the medication into body
tissue, not from the metaphoric invasion into the mind. Once again, one finds
oneself arguing effects that have traditionally been subsumed under a due
process analysis.
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One needs not confine oneself, though, to metaphor.
Neuroscientists now know enough about the neurobiology
underlying social interactions to hypothesize, with some confidence,
the literal neuronal changes that most likely occur when therapists
communicate with patients.9° Using theories developed from the
interdisciplinary study of "social neuroscience," 9 ' one can identify
the major brain structures involved in the neural circuitry of what
Dr. Louis Cozolino has called the "social brain." 92
In brief, several areas of the brain coordinate input from
external sources such as the five senses and speech, and internal
sources such as memories, internal sensations, and linguistic
processing.3 This coordinated input allows persons to evaluate
interpersonal interactions and take purposeful actions based on
those evaluations. One of the most critical areas coordinating these
functions is the orbitofrontal cortex, a part of the brain located just
behind the eyes.94

90. See generally RICHARD BROCKMAN, A MAP OF THE MIND: TOWARD
A SCIENCE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1998); Louis J. COZOLINO, THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: BUILDING AND REBUILDING THE
HUMAN BRAIN (2002) (correlating neuroscientific findings with various

aspects of psychotherapeutic theory and practice).
Two scientific papers are often cited to support the proposition that
physical changes can result from environmental influence alone. In the first,
Dr. Eric Kandel described the neuronal changes that occur in the sea snail
Aplysia when the environmental conditions surrounding it vary, postulating
that similar cellular changes occur in humans when they learn and unlearn
anxiety responses. Eric R. Kandel, From Metapsychology to Molecular
Biology: Explorations into the Nature of Anxiety, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1277
(1983). Later Dr. Jeffrey Schwartz and his colleagues documented the
changes that occur in the brain metabolism of subjects with obsessivecompulsive disorder (an anxiety disorder) after they participate in a course of
psychotherapeutic treatment known as cognitive-behavioral therapy. Jeffrey
M. Schwartz et al., Systematic Changes in Cerebral Glucose Metabolic Rate
After Successful Behavior Modification Treatment of Obsessive-Compulsive
Disorder,53 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 109 (1996).
91. ALLAN N. SCHORE, AFFECT REGULATION AND THE REPAIR OF THE
SELF xii (2003).
92. COZOLINO, supra note 90, at 172-214.
93. Id.
94. As Dr. Daniel Siegel has described it, this area is an
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Other important structures include the amygdala, a region
important for the appraisal of danger and therefore essential to
one's capacity to assess whom one can trust and whom one cannot; 95
the anterior cingulate gyrus, a region important for the
establishment and maintenance of interpersonal attachment;96 and

integrating region . . . involved in stimulus appraisal
(the meaning, value, or emotional valence given to a
stimulus), affect regulation (the capacity of the brain to
modulate its psychophysiological state), social
cognition (the complex process by which one
individual is able to have "mindsight" or the ability to
perceive the mental state of another), and autonoetic
consciousness (the ability to perform mental time
travel).
DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF
INTERPERSONAL EXPERIENCE 140 (1999); see also Edmund T. Rolls, The
Functions of the Orbitofrontal Cortex, in PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL LOBE
FUNCTION 354 (Donald T. Stuss & Robert T. Knight eds., 2002) (summarizing

current research findings). This area of the brain is also involved in "complex
mentalizing task[s] that require[] the use of language [e.g., speech] and active
imagining of another person's mental state." Chadi Calarge et al., Visualizing
How One Brain Understands Another: A PET Study of Theory of Mind, 160
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1954, 1957 (2003). See generally ALLAN N. SCHORE,
AFFECT REGULATION AND THE ORIGIN OF THE SELF: THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF
EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1994) (discussing, in detail, the biology of the

orbitofrontal cortex and its importance in the development and maintenance
of attachment behaviors and a perceived sense of "self").
95. See Ralph Adolphs et al., The Human Amygdala in Social Judgment,
393 NATURE 470 (1998); see also ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, LOOKING FOR
SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND THE FEELING BRAIN 58-60 (2003) (discussing the
role of the amygdala in emotional processing). The amygdala also plays an
important role in the experience of and reaction to fear. See infra notes 98-99
and accompanying text. See generally THE AMYGDALA: A FUNCTIONAL
ANALYSIS (John P. Aggleton ed., 2d ed. 2000) (describing the role of the
amygdala in a variety of mental processes).
96.

ALLAN N.

SCHORE, AFFECT DYSREGULATION AND DISORDERS OF

THE SELF 158-59 (2003). The anterior cingulate gyrus region of the brain is
also thought to be involved in processes of memory, attention focusing,
decision making, and self-control. See JOSEPH LEDOuX, THE EMOTIONAL
BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 277 (1996);
John M. Allman et al., The Anterior Cingulate Cortex: The Evolution of an
Interface Between Emotion and Cognition, 935 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 107
(2001).
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the medial prefrontal cortex, a region important for the processing
of emotion to improve decision making.97 Together these structures
form "the core of the social brain [which,] [d]eveloping from birth
•.. contains our ... memories of our early interpersonal learning
history [and] stores information about the safety and danger of
others, what we can expect when they come close, and if we can
depend on them for nurturance and support." 8 Thanks to these
brain structures, trusted psychotherapists will be experienced and
remembered one way, feared medication prescribers will be
experienced and remembered in another. Either way, neuronal
work goes on in now-identifiable areas of the brain, leading to
lasting brain changes which will impact the future of patients in
ways both predictable and unpredictable.
While interesting from a clinical standpoint, one can easily
ask what legal relevance these scientific findings might have. As
Professor Winick wrote, the metaphoric scar left by unpleasant
personal interactions such as forced treatment are no more than
those left "in any other human transaction. '" If one introduces
arguments based on social neuroscience into a First Amendment
analysis of the right to refuse treatment, one is in danger of proving
too much. Precisely because we are becoming increasingly able to
identify the neurobiological coordinates of such scars, though, a
97. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASio, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION,
REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 31-33 (1994) (documenting how damage to

this region most likely caused the behavioral problems experienced by Phineas
Gage, a man famous in the late nineteenth century for having survived an iron
rod piercing his brain and head); Philippe Fossati et al., In Search of the
Emotional Self.- An fMRI Study Using Positive and Negative Emotional Words,
160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1938 (2003) (finding an important role for the right

dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in the self-guided processing of emotion);
Daniel Tranel, Emotion, Decision Making, and the Ventromedial Prefrontal
Cortex, in PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL LOBE FUNCrION 338 (Donald T. Stuss &

Robert T. Knight eds., 2002) (describing the critical role of emotion in logical
decision making); cf. Thompson, supra note 13 (describing how researchers
analyze this and other areas of the brain to improve consumer responses to
advertising).
98. COZOLINO, supra note 90, at 183.
99. Winick, supra note 8, at 83 (quoting Robert Michels, Ethical Issues of
Psychologicaland PsychotherapeuticMeans of Behavior Control: Is the Moral
ContractBeing Observed?, 3 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 11, 11 (1973)).
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neuroscientific discourse of not only the right to refuse treatment,
but also of the entire free speech jurisprudence is becoming
possible. To see why such a discourse could prove troubling, one
need only examine Professor Winick's arguments about the First
Amendment implications of coerced counseling.
B. The FirstAmendment and Coerced Counseling
In general Professor Winick's arguments related to coerced
counseling follow the same form as those about psychotherapy. His
analysis hinges on how effective therapists can be in getting patients
to achieve the therapists' desired results. '°° "Intrusion" in this
context appears to mean a metaphoric intrusion into a lifestyle that
should lead to some sort of attitude adjustment resulting in a
positive outcome for the individual and/or society. The more likely
-

and more importantly, the more automatically - an attitude

adjustment occurs, apparently the more intrusive the therapy is.
Precisely because counselors in prisons are, in his view, less
effective therapists, 1 and because persons in prisons often have2
more "attitude" than the average person in psychotherapy,
Professor Winick sees little cause for concern about First
Amendment violations in these situations.
As in the case of psychotherapy, he places much importance
on the prisoners' ability to "resist" the therapists' interventions.
100. Winick, supra note 8, at 89 ("[T]he verbal techniques are similar to
the behavioral therapies; both can effectively change attitudes and behavior,
but both are ultimately dependent upon the subject's cooperation and
willingness to change.").
101. Id. at 84 ("Certainly if a patient in psychotherapy can resist or avoid
the effects of this technique at will, an offender can even more easily avoid the
intrusions of the 'counseling' provided by counselors in prison and community
programs who generally lack the professional abilities of those administering
psychotherapy.").
102. Id. at 84-86 ("[A]II students no doubt share the common experience
of having been able to 'tune out' the efforts of their teachers. In any event,
prisoners and even adolescents adjudged juvenile delinquents, long past their
formative years, generally have the power to resist unwanted education.").
103. Id. at 89 ("In view of the ability of patients and offenders to resist
the effects of these essentially verbal interventions, they may readily be
distinguished from the more coercive treatment methods found to violate the
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Once again, resistance has to mean resistance against something something which, in the case of prisoners, can be quite dramatic
and therefore quite memorable. Nevertheless, he does not worry
too much about the First Amendment implications, for "[e]ven the
strong verbal exhortation of prison inmates, bordering on threats of
physical abuse and typical of direct confrontation-style programs,
such as the Juvenile Awareness Project at Rahway State Prison
portrayed in the film "Scared Straight," are within the complete
power of the listener to accept or reject."'1 "
The "Scared" in the film title, though, implicates yet
another neuroscientific discourse system: the neural circuitry
system in the brain called by Dr. Louis Cozolino the "fearful
brain."'0 5 The fear system, centered around the brain area called
the amygdala, is perhaps one of the most well-studied emotional
systems of the brain and affects multiple areas of brain and body
function.' °6 In some individuals, the stress hormones activated by
the fear system can lead to wide-ranging changes in memory and
even body function, the well-documented effects of "trauma."10 7
Metaphorically speaking, fear is quite intrusive in its effects on the
body, leading to physical changes that are anything but transitory.
Professor Winick is almost certainly correct when he concludes that
the Justices of the Court would likely find no First Amendment
first amendment in cases involving psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy,
or psychotropic medication.").
104. Id. at 86.
105. COZOLINO, supra note 90, at 235-56.
106. See id. at 244; LEDOUX, supra note 96, at 225-66; Kevin S. LaBar et
al., Human Amygdala Activation During Conditioned Fear Acquisition and

Extinction: A Mixed-Trial fMRI Study, 20 NEURON 937 (1998); Joseph E.
LeDoux, Emotion, Memory and the Brain, 270 Sci. AM. June 1994, at 50. See
generally THE AMYGDALA: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 95.
107. See COZOLINO, supra note 90, at 257-85; Dennis S. Charney,
Psychobiological Mechanisms of Resilience and Vulnerability: Implicationsfor

Successful Adaptation to Extreme Stress, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 195 (2004);
Ruth A. Lanius et al., The Nature of Traumatic Memories: A 4-T fMRI
Functional Connectivity Analysis, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 36 (2004); David J.
Nutt & Andrea L. Malizia, Structural and Functional Brain Changes in
PosttraumaticStress Disorder,65 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 11 (Supp. 1 2004);
see also BROCKMAN, supra note 90, at 223-48; SIEGEL, supra note 94, at 50-55
(discussing the role of stress in the formation of traumatic memories).
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violation if they were asked to evaluate "coerced counseling"
programs.'08 If amygdalae could talk, however, those of the inmates
who have participated in such coerced counseling programs might
not be quite as matter-of-fact about that conclusion as Professor
Winick appears to be.
Still, if one wishes to consider the ramifications of a
neuroscientific discourse of the First Amendment, Professor
Winick's case analogies used to support his claim for the
constitutionality of coerced counseling are instructive. Having no
cases directly on point to offer judicial support for his argument, he
compares coerced counseling to the education of children: if the
Court has upheld the government's right to instruct (sometimes)
unwilling students, it should also uphold the government's right to
instruct (often) unwilling prisoners. 109 The State has a compelling
interest in using speech to form and/or reform minds and hearts in
both these contexts. In making these arguments, Professor Winick
fills his footnotes with memorable quotations from some of the
great opinions of the school speech cases decided up to the date of
the writing of his article. n° All the quotations speak forcefully of the
State's interest in using words not only to teach the 3R's, but also to
teach the values of a civil society.I"
108. As Professor Tribe notes, "Since confinement itself may be
regarded as a crude form of behavior modification, it seems clear that there
can be no general prohibition against a governmental decision to subject
persons who have caused harm to at least some [behavior modification]
techniques." TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1327.
109. Winick, supra note 8, at 84-85.
110. Id. at 84 n.499 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding a student's right to wear black armbands
as a passive protest)); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 696
(1986) (holding that punishing a student for his speech at an assembly, which
included sexual metaphor and lewd speech, was not a violation of his right to
free speech under the First Amendment); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
875 (1982) (finding a genuine issue of fact regarding a school board's removal
of books from a school library based upon political ideology).
111. Id.; see Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683 ("The inculcation of these values is
truly the 'work of the schools."'); Pico, 457 U.S. 853 at 864 ("[L]ocal school
boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a
way as to transmit community values .... '). Professor Winick also quotes
school cases from Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Abington School
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These quotations remind one, however, of far more. They
remind one that all state actors are speakers whether the person is a
therapist, teacher, or a government official. Furthermore, all
speakers hope to make an impact upon their audiences. If the
government funds one speech activity rather than another, it does
so precisely because it wants the hearers of that speech not only to
hear the message but also to remember it. If the State supports
patriotism, it wants people to become and/or remain patriotic. The
purpose of the First Amendment is to promote a marketplace for
ideas for people to be able to listen, compare, and decide on the
value of the words of speakers. 1 2 In other words, why speak if one
is not going to make a .difference
in the minds and thought
113
processes of those who listen?
V. FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE AND
NEUROSCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

The government must have an interest in promoting at least
some messages, even if they are as basic as "respect your country"
or "crime does not pay."
The government wants citizens to
remember these messages and feel their impact. Therefore, the
government wants all the requisite brain areas of citizens to fire
their neurons when they think of and respond to these messages.
Mind arises out of brain activity, so whenever one is trying to
influence a mind, one is trying to change a brain. This argument is

District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he

public school [is] a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a
democratic system of government."), and Equal Protection jurisprudence,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("[E]ducation has a fundamental role
in maintaining the fabric of our society," and "the pivotal role of education [is]
in sustaining our political and cultural heritage .... ).
112. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF GOVERNMENT 25-26 (1948).
113. Cf LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 10 (1986) ("[F]ree speech
involves a special act of carving out one area of social interaction for
extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and
demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social
encounters.") (emphasis added).
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obvious. If neuroscientific discourse is to have any meaning in the
First Amendment, it must rise to something not so trivial.
Solely as a matter of legal rules, perhaps it is trivial. People
speak. People listen. Governments must be prevented from unduly
interfering with both those activities. Rules will have to be made.
As a matter of rhetoric, however, of discourse, of the justification
for the legal rules that must be made and followed, one should not
be so dismissive. 14 As one commentator put it, "having bitten into
the neuroscientific apple, can we go back to the Garden as though
nothing has happened?"" 5
Consider the following hypothetical. The government
begins a campaign urging citizens to vote in the next election.
Officials post billboards and publish advertisements in the media
and on the Internet urging citizens to vote. No one feels uneasy
with that. Officials conduct focus groups and surveys to determine
the most effective means of conveying their message. Again,
probably few feel uneasy with that.
But imagine that the government now conducts extensive
research with subjects by monitoring the changes in their brain
glucose metabolism in response to the messages. Researchers see
which parts of the subjects' brains light up in response to which
message. They search for metabolic activity in various emotion-

114. Commentators describe this rhetorical problem as being one of
"folk psychology," defined as:
[T]he
prescientific,
commonsense
conceptual
framework that all normally socialized humans deploy
in order to comprehend, predict, explain, and
manipulate the behavior of humans and the higher
animals. This framework includes concepts such as
belief, desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear,
suspicion, memory, recognition, anger, sympathy,
intention, and so forth.
Robert Birmingham, Folk Psychology and Legal Understanding,32 CONN. L.
REV. 1715, 1716 (2000) (citing Paul M. Churchland, Folk Psychology, in PAUL
M. CHURCHLAND & PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND, ON THE CONTRARY:

CRITICAL ESSAYS 1987-1997 3, 3 (1998)). See generally Lelling, supra note 14
(analyzing how certain understandings of neuroscience appear to make such
folk psychology assumptions untenable).
115. Birmingham, supra note 114, at 1726.
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related parts of the brain. They correlate such activity with any
metabolic activity occurring in those areas of the brain associated
with other functions such as language recognition, executive control
of attention processes, nonconscious recognition of nonlinguistic
elements of a message, and so forth. The researchers monitor
subjects' brain functioning over time to determine how they might
increase the likelihood that a message will not only be evaluated
positively, but also remembered.
Based on this data, the
government then tailors its message to maximize its impact on the
long-term cognitive and emotional memory circuitry of persons
who hear that message. By this point, I suspect that most persons
will have become at least a bit uneasy with the implications of all
this.
Unlike Soma, this is not the stuff of dystopic fiction. Similar
research is already being conducted to influence an individual's
choices about consumer products." 6 Government officials may even
be conducting such research for their own interests at this
moment.1 7 Even if one cannot guarantee that a particular message
will produce a particular neuronal effect on any particular
individual, with enough research one may be able to get enough
information about brain functioning to get enough of the message
out to get enough of the vote in. To get persons' brains to respond
in such a way as to maximize their chances of voting is one thing.
To get their brains to respond so as to maximize their chances of
voting a certain way is quite another.
Yet, the message that arises out of all that research will be
speech and speech alone - no chemical or nanotechnological device
has been inserted in anyone. Research may be expensive, but talk
is cheap. Everyone is free to follow one's conscience. Everyone is
free to ignore as one chooses.
All of that is true. But the real possibility of that wellresearched message returns us to Sell, to metaphor, and to silence.
116. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
117. In fact, private researchers are already looking at the differences in
brain functioning (for example, amygdala activation with perceived threats)
between Republican and Democratic voters when asked to respond to specific
issues. John Tierney, Using M.R.I. 's To See Politics On the Brain, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2004, at Al.
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Out of what the opinion does not say, Sell reminds us that the real
residue of any psychiatric encounter, long after the last molecule of
medication has passed through the liver on its way to the kidney, is
always in the neuronal traces of the personal encounters that
happened during the treatment. Those neuronal traces - those real,
physical, neuronal memories and their associated mental
representations - are the real invasions and colonizations of the
body brought on by treatment that is not desired and that
potentially intrudes on First Amendment protections. 8 But
to
know that is to take seriously the true physiological impacts of
human relationships. It is to endorse a discourse of nature that
brings with it a discourse of permanence and of uncertain effect.
We never know when events will so trigger neuronal structures so
that a person is forced to remember, either representationally or
viscerally, some event of the past. Forced medications may come
and go, but encounters stick with us, even if only to require some
degree of neuropsychological energy to keep them ejected from
consciousness. Moreover, forced encounters do not happen only in
118. In a brief otherwise devoted to concerns about the ramifications of
physical invasions into the mind, the CCLE added support to this conclusion
by including the following quotation:
[Miost of us suppose that we are endowed with free
will. But if choices by free will are simply the
resolution of conflicts of neurological subsystems, and
we become consciously aware of those subsystems and
are able to intervene in their processes, do we run the
risk of runaway instabilities at the deepest levels of
what we presently call our 'minds'? Will we find that
these instabilities are profound counterparts to the
maladies we currently designate as epilepsy, or
psychosomatic illnesses? In any redesigns of our brains
which would involve opening doors to, quite literally,
the ultrastructure of our thoughts, we could become
'naked to ourselves' in ways that we can only vaguely
speculate about at present. Along with any other
dangers we might encounter, this will raise entirely
new issues of the proper role of psychotherapy and the
sanctity of personal privacy.
CCLE Brief, supra note 39, at 19 n.15 (quoting ROBERT A. FREITAS, JR., 1
NANOMEDICINE: BASIC CAPABILITIES §

1.2.5 (1999)).
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psychiatric hospitals or their prison counterparts. Every student
who is forced to listen to a particular view of history, every prisoner
who is forced to listen to a particular view of moral behavior, and
even every person who is forced to decide whether to pay attention
to a public service announcement is being "invaded" neuronally always, of course, for a compelling state interest.
As a result, through this neuroscientific discourse, we can
come to understand that the First Amendment becomes
"incorporated" in a genuinely different manner from the way we
have come to associate with that term. Ideas and perceptions are
not just meant to enter someone in corporem. They are meant to
stay in corpore.19 This is the whole purpose of the transmission of
ideas and speech. Neuroscientific discourse may not tell us
something new about what the First Amendment should protect,
but it does give us a more embodied sense of the seriousness of the
whole matter. It is not just the Fifth, Fourth 2 or the Eighth"'
Amendments that protect our bodies. It is also the First.
VI. CONCLUSION

Law is a pragmatic discipline. What is obscene or not
obscene, for example - and just how one's eyes and brains will get
access to it - will never be a question to which neuroscientists will
have much to say. True, scientists certainly have much to say about
the effects of bodily invasions of the brain, and they will continue to
119. The Latin phrase in corporem is in the accusative case, indicating
motion toward something and thus translatable as "into the body." The
phrase in corpore, in contrast, is in the ablative case, indicating static location
within something and thus translatable as "in(side) the body."
120. The Fourth Amendment grants:
The right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST.

amend. IV.

121. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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do so; but, after Sell, in the criminal context at least, the only laws
that will have much to 22say back to them are the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Law is, however, a socially-situated discipline as well.
Eventually it must speak to what people are talking about.
Neuroscientists will certainly continue to talk about both their
findings and the implication of those findings, thereby causing lay
people to notice and think. In this context, jurists and scholars will
eventually have to confront the fact that neuroscientists will not
only have much to say to the Law, but that also they will almost
certainly keep on saying what they have to say, over and over. As
scientists do so, as they continue to talk about orbitofrontal cortices
and amygdalae, these concepts will translate into everyday speech
and language.
Phrases such as motivational saliences and
interpersonal processes will eventually become linked to words
123
such as fear, belief, trust, and action. Arcane medical jargon will
give way to easily comprehensible expressions of human
experience, and the promotion and regulation of human
experiences is, after all, ultimately what Law is all about. "Freedom
of thought" and the First Amendment may never be the same
because of the impact of such words and the underlying
neuroscientific research. With talk like that circulating around
them, the Justices of the Court will one day, Sell notwithstanding,
no longer have the luxury of maintaining silence-no matter what
124
the reason.

122. The Fourteenth Amendment states that "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
123. Already these nonscientific terms are finding their way not only into
serious books about the subject, e.g., GREGORY BERNS, M.D., Ph.D.,
SATISFACTION: THE SCIENCE OF FINDING TRUE FULFILLMENT (2005), but also

into the most respected scientific publications. See Laura Helmuth, CaudateOver-Heels in Love, 302 SCI. 1320 (2003).

124. Cf. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts v. the Future, N.Y. TIMES MAG., August
28, 2005, at 24 (discussing how scientific and technological advances will
impact cases that may come before the Court in the next ten years).

